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European Works Councils as Risk
Communities: The Case of General Motors
ABSTRACT ■ The European works council (EWC) at General Motors is widely
regarded as an outstanding example of cross-border trade union coopera-
tion. This article reconstructs its development as a European trade union
‘risk community’, which since the mid-1990s has faced unprecedented chal-
lenges to workers’ interests as a result of intra-European competition for
investment and GM’s strategy of corporate globalization. To a limited extent,
the EWC offered a European solution to local and national problems, but
cross-border cooperation has remained fragile and issue-specific, and has
implied a Eurocentric notion of trade union internationalism.
KEYWORDS: European works councils ■ General Motors ■ international
trade unionism ■ solidarity
Introduction
Since the early 1990s European works councils (EWC) have attracted a
great deal of attention by industrial relations scholars. Research output
has grown impressively, but was long dominated by a debate whether or
not EWCs represent a breakthrough towards transnational industrial
relations and trade unionism. ‘Optimists’, starting from agency-based
assumptions, considered labour representatives’ capacity to overcome
linguistic, cultural and trust barriers as the crucial variable. Where this
capacity was strong, an EWC would progress through different stages,
from pure information recipients to negotiation partners (Lecher et al.,
1999). ‘Pessimists’, by contrast, emphasized structural factors hampering
the emergence of transnational union solidarity in EWCs. They sugges-
ted that the councils would even heighten rather than ease regime com-
petition by which national labour representatives are pitted against each
other in conflicts over jobs and investment (Streeck, 1997).
Whilst useful in laying out different methodological avenues available
for EWC research, the limits of both optimist and pessimist approaches
were revealed by the strong variation in concrete EWC experience.
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Consequently, scholars have turned to the analysis of the conditions
under which EWCs do or do not become active European players.
Kotthoff (2006), Marginson (2000) and Marginson et al. (2004), for exam-
ple, have convincingly demonstrated that EWC effectiveness is crucially
dependent on factors such as the degree of company internationalization
and the existence of autonomous European management structures. By
implication, there is no automatism of EWCs developing from informa-
tion committees into ‘social actors’ (Lecher) through learning and trust-
building processes on the union side. Indeed, in the absence of facilitating
factors, labour representatives may lack any incentive to ask for the estab-
lishment of a EWC; it is noteworthy in this regard that ten years after the
adoption of the directive, under half the firms covered by the legislation
have set up councils (Knudsen et al., 2007).
Against the pessimist position it has been correctly maintained that the
link between EWC development and regime competition is more complex
than often assumed. According to circumstances, worker representatives’
experiences of being played off against each other may either provoke
mutual distrust or act as a motive to enhance cross-border cooperation. In
fact, several authors have found that strong EWCs often develop in com-
panies with a high degree of inter-firm investment and job competition
(Anner et al., 2006; Kotthoff, 2006).
This article adds to these insights with a case study of trade union coop-
eration in the EWC at General Motors (GM) Europe. Assessments of this
EWC have changed radically since the late 1990s, when the company was
presented as clear evidence for the arguments of ‘pessimists’ (Hancké,
2000). Today, it is widely regarded as being a paradigm of EWC effective-
ness, hardly matched in any other firm (Carley and Hall, 2006; Whittall
et al., 2007). There are good descriptive accounts of the dynamics culmi-
nating in the conclusion of several framework agreements since 2000
between the EWC and GM’s European management; they reveal the
achievements yet also the limits of cross-border union cooperation, as
EWC negotiations did not replace but supplemented local and national
bargaining (Banyuls and Haipeter, 2007; da Costa and Rehfeldt, 2007;
Pulignano, 2006; Rehfeldt, 2004). However, interpretations offered for the
‘vanguard’ role of the EWC are neither fully convincing empirically (see
below) nor theoretically grounded. Moreover, the importance of corpo-
rate globalization for EWC development is not addressed.
The interpretation offered in this article is based on the notion of ‘risk
community’, which is derived on the one hand from existing EWC
research, and on the other from theoretical and historical scholarship about
international trade union cooperation. I argue that GM union representa-
tives from different countries have supported transnational action through
the EWC because the labour market interests of their constituencies were
negatively affected by the company’s transnational business strategies, and
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because they perceived a mutual dependence in order to counter this
threat. While GM’s European trade unionists were thus united by a shared
sense of vulnerability, their joint initiatives were limited to the search for
broad ‘safety barriers’ and did not overcome the perspective of inter-plant
competition.
General Motors and its EWC
GM is the world’s largest automotive group, headquartered in Detroit and
with a strong presence in Europe, employing around 60,000 workers. Its
European engagement reaches back to the 1920s, when the firm opened
assembly facilities in Belgium and Denmark and acquired Vauxhall
Motors in Luton (UK) and Adam Opel AG in Rüsselsheim (Germany).
After 1945 its German operations expanded strongly, leading in the 1960s
to the opening of new plants in Bochum and Kaiserslautern (Dassbach,
1989). Germany remains by far the largest European GM location,
accounting for some 40 percent of total employment. Vauxhall fell behind
from the late 1960s despite the launch of an additional facility at Ellesmere
Port, a trend which was accelerated with the partial closure of the Luton
plant in 2000 (Holden, 2003). GM diversified its European production
geography from the late 1970s, opening a large manufacturing complex in
Zaragoza (Spain) and component facilities in France and Austria. Since the
fall of the iron curtain, new plants have been established in Eisenach (East
Germany), Poland (Gliwice), Hungary (Esztergom) and Russia
(Togliatti). GM’s merger with Saab added a strong Swedish component
(assembly at Trollhättan) (Bordenave and Lung, 2003).
GM’s European production geography is reflected in the composition
of the company’s EWC, which is formally called ‘European Employee
Forum’. It was set up in 1996 under Article 13 of the EWC directive, and
since 2000 has comprised 29 employee delegates: six from Germany, four
from the UK, three each from Belgium, Spain and Sweden, two each
from France and Austria, and one each from Denmark, Greece, the
Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, and Portugal. The EWC has been chaired
by the president of the central Opel works council, first Rudolf Müller,
later Klaus Franz, with the deputy position taken by the Belgian trade
unionist Rudy Kennes. 
The development of the EWC towards a status as negotiation partner
of GM European management is well-documented, and need not be
rehearsed in detail here. The first agreement was concluded in the year
2000 regarding GM’s European power train operations, which were to be
transferred into a joint venture with Fiat; it gave long-term employment
and wage guarantees for the workers concerned. In the spring of 2001 the
EWC negotiated a second European framework agreement in the wake
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of a crisis over the Luton plant, and the following October another agree-
ment related to a European restructuring programme was concluded
(Herber and Schäfer-Klug, 2002; Klebe and Roth, 2000). In October
2004, the EWC opposed company plans for the closure of a European
plant, resulting in fresh negotiations concluded two months later. In par-
allel, the body became involved in the process of investment allocation
for the new Vectra/Saab ranges (Bartmann, 2005). This trend has recently
been reinforced through active EWC participation in the ‘site selection
process’ for the next generation of ‘Delta’ (Astra) vehicles involving the
plants in Bochum, Antwerp, Ellesmere Port, Trollhättan and Gliwice
(Banyuls and Haipeter, 2007). Most of these negotiations were accompa-
nied by ‘European action days’, with token strikes or demonstrations in
the different European plants.
Data for this article were collected using primary and secondary
sources. Most importantly, the analysis is based on unpublished trade
union documents in Germany and the UK going back to the late 1980s,
and the local and national press in both countries, for the most recent
period supplemented by the use of Internet-based sources and docu-
ments published by the European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) and
the GM EWC itself. In addition, a small number of semi-structured
interviews were conducted with trade union officials and works council-
lors in the UK and Germany. The limited amount of interview-based evi-
dence may be regarded as a methodological shortcoming, partially offset
however by the extensive use of written sources. Moreover, the article
focuses on trade union perceptions of changing company structures and
strategies, rather than on the chronology of concrete actions and events,
for which more interview-based sources would indeed be indispensable.
EWCs as Trade Union ‘Risk Communities’: Conceptual
Considerations
The notion of risk community is based, first of all, on the assumption that
national trade unions will seek international cooperation when they per-
ceive international economic processes as threatening the labour market
interests of their members, most importantly with regard to job security
and wage levels. This reading follows the interpretation put forward by
Logue (1980), who argues that national unions are unlikely to launch
major international initiatives in the absence of concrete labour market
problems which they are unable to tackle by exclusively national means
of action. This limited nature of trade union internationalism reflects the
fact that unions are democratically constituted organizations; their rep-
resentatives are accountable to local and national constituencies and tend
to view international issues through domestic lenses (Logue, 1980). This
implies that organized labour faces a structural problem of parochialism
(Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980).
Recent research demonstrates that this interpretation can be applied to
EWCs. For example, a study of EWC involvement in processes of transna-
tional restructuring (Carley and Hall, 2006) points out that these are likely
to trigger EWC activity only where labour representatives perceive them to
have a negative impact on employment security.
Yet this is only half the story. Undoubtedly pressure on employment
and wage standards has been high in the West European motor industry
since the early 1990s, as a result of slower demand growth and heightened
competition in the wake of the Single European Market and the fall of the
iron curtain (Dicken, 2007). However, this pressure, reflected in frequent
cost-driven rationalization programmes coupled to management tech-
niques of whipsawing and international performance benchmarking, has
been observable in all major firms (Zagelmeyer, 2000). The question is
why worker representatives turned the EWC into an instrument of
transnational negotiation over corporate restructuring only at GM and
Ford, whose EWC has also played a very active role since 2000 (Carley
and Hall, 2006; Klebe and Roth, 2000).
The notion of risk community is suggested here to account for this dif-
ference. Compared to the situation in firms like Volkswagen, Fiat, or
Renault the interests of national trade unions and works councils at GM
have been more evenly affected by processes of corporate international-
ization. To a greater extent than in the other companies, GM labour rep-
resentatives have perceived internationalization as a common threat.
This perception has an internal and an external dimension. With regard
to the former, da Costa and Rehfeldt (2007) argue that EWC activity at
GM has benefited from the fact that the company headquarters is in the
USA, which prevented European unions from seeking national solutions.
Other explanatory factors put forward by da Costa and Rehfeldt, for
example high trade union density, a long tradition of cross-border con-
tacts and the leading role of German representatives, are less convincing:
all apply equally, for example, to Volkswagen. And as Marginson et al.
(2004) demonstrate, American ownership does not ‘guarantee’ the emer-
gence of an active EWC. The crucial point is that US-owned firms seem
more likely than their European-owned counterparts to display a num-
ber of structural characteristics, which apply to GM: a high degree of
cross-border integration, wide geographical spread of European oper-
ations and relatively autonomous European management structures.
From the point of view of national unions, this pattern translates into a
strong awareness of mutual vulnerability and of the limited effectiveness
of national channels of influence (Kotthoff, 2006).
This contrasts with the situation in EU-based car producers. While
the latter, in particular Volkswagen, have also moved towards European
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integration of facilities, there is still a very strong focus of ‘production
geography’ on the home country (Dicken, 2007). Moreover, these firms
lack an independent European management: European strategies are
decided in the national headquarters in Wolfsburg, Paris or Turin.
A common threat perception is thus less likely to emerge in EU-based
firms, as national unions in the home country retain a privileged position
in two crucial respects. First, they can to some extent rely on the need of
these firms to retain a positive image in the eyes of national governments
and public opinions: witness the attempted or actual closures of foreign
rather than domestic production plants by Renault, Volkswagen and
Peugeot over the last decade. Second, labour representatives in the ‘core’
countries have few incentives to turn EWCs into negotiating bodies since
they dispose of national channels of influence. In Volkswagen, for exam-
ple, the EWC has been sidelined because the company’s supervisory
board has remained the crucial arena for decision-making over inter-
national corporate strategy. There have been intensive cross-border
union contacts even beyond Europe but they have always been conduct-
ed under the leadership of German employee representatives who have
become, to a certain extent, ‘advocates of the diaspora’ (Kotthoff) in
negotiations with German management. For their counterparts in other
countries, however, this has at times raised the question ‘whether home
country employee representatives use their influence . . . in ways that are
of benefit to employees Europe-wide or whether it is used more to fur-
ther or protect their national interests’ (Carley and Hall, 2006: 67).
Turning to the external dimension of ‘risk community’, it is astonishing
how little attention EWC research has so far paid to processes of eco-
nomic globalization. Some studies have pointed to the role of EWCs in
the elaboration of global codes of conduct by multinational firms, while
others have described how the existence of EWCs can trigger a dynamic
towards voluntary global works councils (Miller, 2004, Müller et al., 2004).
Yet, these activities are mostly regarded as stepping stones for a global regu-
latory regime, rather than as consciously European strategies to deal with
economic globalization. That the most active EWCs are to be found in
non-European firms has usually been explained with exclusive reference
to these companies’ lack of a national centre, which, as the GM case
shows, is indeed a crucial factor. The only hint at a potential role of an
external dimension is provided by Huijgen et al. (2007: 224), who suggest
that the strong profile of EWCs in companies like Ford or GM might be
the result of an identity projection in which ‘the “Other” is located out-
side Europe’. Yet they do not develop this argument further.
This lack of attention to the external dimension is surprising not least
because aspects of global economic change have played a prominent role
for the agenda of European integration since the the late 1980s, reflected
in the growth of a literature on ‘new regionalism’, which conceptualizes
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Europe as one among several regional blocs whose interactions constitute
the global political economy. European institutions are seen to have
acquired functions in relation to the challenges that globalization incurs
upon European nation-states (Breslin, 2002; Fort and Webber, 2006).
These are important elements for the study of EWCs since their emer-
gence in the 1990s was clearly linked to the growing if vague discourse
about a ‘European social model’, a response not least to concerns to safe-
guard European welfare regimes. EWCs appear to reflect a shared
European commitment to collectively organized industrial relations in
contrast to the American model of deregulated labour markets and the
management-dominated Japanese model of company-level employment
relations (Hyman, 2005).
In a more mundane sense, EWCs can be seen as new vehicles of inter-
est representation for European workforces in processes of global com-
pany restructuring. Like Ford, GM has made considerable though not
always successful efforts towards global integration of its operations over
the last decade (Bordenave and Lung, 2003). This process, described in
more detail below, has translated into a second level of common threat
for GM trade unionists in Europe. Alongside the perception of mutual
vulnerability within Europe, worker representatives have also developed
a sense of shared European vulnerability vis-a`-vis GM locations in other
world regions. This is again in marked contrast to the situation in EU-
based companies. While Europe has always been the ‘junior partner’
within GM’s global operations, most European firms have remained
strongly Eurocentric in their production geographies (Dicken, 2007), and
they have also been much less prone to engage in global rationalization
schemes (Freyssenet et al., 2003). Moreover, even in cases such as the
abortive Daimler–Chrysler merger where the non-European dimension
became temporarily prominent, this was not an incentive for more EWC
activity. Given that the bulk of Daimler–Chrysler’s European production
was in Germany, and that global strategy was designed through coord-
ination between the national headquarters in Germany and the United
States, the representation of ‘European interests’ was largely irrelevant.
Focusing our analysis on the interaction between company structures
and union labour market interests does not mean that we deny the
importance of other factors contributing to the dynamic development of
the EWC at General Motors, such as personal relations between dele-
gates, the pre-history of cross-border union contacts or the role played
by national unions and the EMF (da Costa and Rehfeldt, 2007;
Pulignano, 2006). It is clear that a perception of shared vulnerability does
not in itself ‘guarantee’ the adoption of common objectives by worker
representatives, and still less the actual effectiveness of an EWC.
Perceptions need to be translated into action through political strategies,
and whether these will be successful depends not least on management
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attitudes and policies. A systematic analysis of these aspects is beyond the
scope of this article, and the explanatory ambition is confined to propos-
ing a set of conditions which – given their reflection in the perceptions of
worker representatives themselves – seem crucial elements favouring the
development of the EWC.
A European Trade Union ‘Risk Community’: Internal Dimension
The EWC’s agenda for negotiations with European management at GM
demonstrates the salience of risk and threat perceptions. With the partial
exception of the agreement related to the Fiat joint venture in 2000, bar-
gaining positions usually concentrated on two basic demands: European
restructuring should occur without entire production sites being closed,
and employment cutbacks should be implemented without compulsory
redundancies (Carley and Hall, 2006). In addition, and increasingly in
recent years, there was a concern to protect established local and national
wages and conditions (Bartmann, 2005).
These EWC demands reflect an essentially defensive posture against
GM’s regular exercises in European restructuring, aimed since the mid-
1990s at headcount and labour cost reductions. In one sense, this was not
much different from the situation in other European car firms. Against the
background of heightened competition, all companies pursued strategies
of cost-driven rationalization coupled to techniques of international per-
formance benchmarking, to which unions, rather than opposing this
agenda in principle, responded by insisting on socially responsible
restructuring (Zagelmeyer, 2000).
What was peculiar about GM, however, was the conscious attempt to
‘share the pain’ across Europe, and hence to empower the EWC to con-
duct European-level negotiations. To reiterate our central argument, the
main reason was that to a greater extent than in other companies, work-
er representatives perceived GM’s restructuring programmes as a com-
mon threat. This perception, in turn, mirrored the specificities of GM’s
European structures and strategies. First, its production facilities are
highly integrated across the continent. Largely standardized European
vehicles are each produced in several locations and countries, supple-
mented by extensive cross-border shipments of components. The inte-
gration process which dates back to the mid-1970s acquired crucial
momentum in the late 1980s in response to the Single European Market
project (Dassbach, 1989). The company now frequently threatened to
shift production and investments between locations, and used such
threats to obtain trade union concessions, such as a reform of shift sys-
tems (Mueller and Purcell, 1992). This led GM trade unionists to reflect
on the necessity for European-level consultation. In Germany, IG
Metall president Franz Steinkühler referred explicitly to Ford and GM in
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(3)
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April 1988, calling for an EWC because of the dangers concession bar-
gaining in foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms implied for German
employment and wage standards.
Since the mid-1990s the problem has magnified as GM, constantly 
losing market share between 1995 and 2004, has been faced with an
almost permanent problem of overcapacity. Threats of relocation of pro-
duction and consequential plant closure have become recurrent; and,
more than in the case of EU-based firms, such threats have hung in a sim-
ilar way over many of GM’s European plants, as the company devised
ever more sophisticated methods of internal competition. Though not all
plants have been vulnerable to closure to the same extent, it is neverthe-
less significant that EWC agreements often occurred when cutback
threats affected several locations: Bochum, Antwerp and Zaragoza in
autumn 2001, Rüsselsheim and Trollhättan in 2004 (Bartmann, 2005), all
West European ‘Delta’ plants in 2007.
Apart from GM’s strong capacity for cross-border asset-switching,
this common perception of threat has been favoured by the geographical
dispersion of GM facilities, and by the existence of an autonomous
European management organization. The potential even for German
unions, representing some 40 percent of European GM workers, to ‘play
the national card’ has been very limited. It is true that suspicions about a
‘German bias’ in GM’s European strategy have arisen repeatedly among
unionists from other locations. Recent management comments justifying
cutbacks at Antwerp rather than Bochum with reference to the need to
retain a good brand image in GM’s largest European market have con-
firmed that this is indeed to some extent the case.
However, German unions at GM can rely on such a logic to a much
lesser extent than, say, their counterparts at Volkswagen, which needs to
defend a German market share that is twice the level of GM. Still more
importantly, Opel worker representatives lack the privileged access to
corporate decision-making enjoyed by their colleagues at VW. In 1986
GM decided to shift the coordination functions of its European business
from the Opel headquarters in Rüsselsheim to Zurich, strongly en-
hancing the autonomy of the new European organization and hence the
ability of the company to deploy credible threats of investment switch-
ing in negotiations with all national unions.
Moreover, European and national GM managers often deliberately
raise uncertainty as to the outcome of the regular rounds of corporate
restructuring. A senior Opel manager publicly argued in 1993 that strat-
egies to heighten competition between European locations could, if
applied in ‘small doses’, be used to accelerate efficiency improvements in
the whole European group. On several occasions, rumours of impending
cutbacks were spread by top managers talking in general terms about the
urgent need to cut European overcapacity, or even claiming that GM
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needed to close one or several of its European plants. Such statements
often triggered a wave of speculation in different countries, further
fuelled by public debates about the complex character of investment and
cutback decisions in the motor industry.
The sense of a shared European vulnerability reflects not only the
impact of such management tactics but also the failed attempts of nation-
al unions themselves to ‘go it alone’, that is, to deal with crises through
purely domestic means. During the 1990s, national unions had actively
contributed to inter-plant competition through unilateral and often
secret negotiations with local or national management, deliberately
designed to obtain investment at the expense of other locations. The basic
feature was always the same: in exchange for management commitments
to future investment, unions agreed to wage cuts or measures to improve
labour productivity. As Hancké (2000) argues, the origin of this type of
bargaining clearly lay with the IG Metall where the concept of
Standortsicherung (protecting production locations, implying that this
would be at the expense of other locations) was elevated to a national
strategy from the early 1990s. The central Opel works council con-
cluded the first such agreement in 1993, followed in late 1997 by a simi-
lar deal. The latter caused a spiral of ‘domino’ concession bargaining;
within weeks of the German negotiations similar agreements were signed
in Belgium, Spain and the UK.
It was not least this experience that made European trade unionists at
GM understand their mutual vulnerability. British delegates were particu-
larly critical, pointing to the ‘knock-on’ effects of investment agreements
in Germany and Belgium on plants in the UK and the inactivity of the
EWC in this regard. In their cumulative effect the national agreements
further heightened inter-plant competition, since management invest-
ment commitments significantly added to the overcapacity problem
within the European operations. The closure of Vectra assembly at Luton
in 2000 demonstrated that GM’s European management did not recoil
from reneging upon agreements entered into shortly before (Holden,
2003) and hence that national deals were no guarantee for future job
security. Moreover, a continuation of unilateral national negotiations in
the context of GM’s European structures appeared to translate into ever
new rounds of ‘domino bargaining’, and hence in a race to the bottom
with dangerous implications for wages and working conditions in all
European GM locations. This strongly strengthened the belief in the
need for at least a minimum degree of cross-border understanding to
protect local and national collective labour standards in the longer term
(Herber and Schäfer-Klug, 2002). The use of metaphors like ‘safety bar-
rier’ to describe EWC framework agreements signals the awareness of
national representatives that in the peculiar circumstances of GM they
could no longer autonomously safeguard their labour market interests.
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The practical procedural consequence was a mutual commitment by
local and national representatives to refrain from unilateral concession
bargaining in situations of European restructuring, prior to the conclusion
of a framework agreement by the EWC. While this could appear easy to
implement in occasions of ‘sharing losses’ it is a complex task in processes
of investment allocation. In the recent ‘Delta’ case, for example, European
management had set cost-saving targets for individual plants, and agreed
to negotiate with the EWC only after the representatives from each
‘Delta’ plant had provided a ‘letter of intent’ revealing their potential
commitment to achieve these cost savings in the event of a positive allo-
cation decision.
This last point reveals that the increasingly active role of the EWC can-
not be taken to mean that local and national bargaining arenas have been
losing importance, and still less that worker representatives are in the
process of abandoning their local and national allegiances in search of a
transnational European identity. In fact, all the EWC agreements stipu-
late that most of the detailed restructuring measures are to be carried out
at domestic level, and the implications of these measures for individual
sites have often been very different (Pulignano, 2006). Unsurprisingly,
therefore, the degree of support given to the EWC by the locations also
varies; it can hardly be considered a coincidence, for example, that the
date chosen for the most recent ‘European action day’ in May 2007 coin-
cided with a national holiday in Poland, which gave an easy justification
for the non-participation of workers at Gliwice, where relatively little
will change as a result of the ‘Delta’ process. Yet Polish union represen-
tatives did not oppose EWC initiatives, not least because the future of
their plant does not appear totally safe either. As Meardi (2004) has
argued, relocations of production since EU enlargement have occurred
westwards and eastwards; more specifically in the case of GM, the
Gliwice plant has itself already been affected by a small production
relocation to another East European facility run by GM in a joint ven-
ture with Suzuki (Banyuls and Haipeter, 2007).
The EWC continuously faces the task of reconciling diverging local and
national interests; in fact, next to providing ‘safety barriers’ its most impor-
tant objective seems to be the elaboration of accepted rules for ‘fair com-
petition’ between locations, such as the transparency of investment tenders
and the definition of ‘bottom lines’ for wage concessions (Bartmann, 2005).
The EWC and the associated EMF committee act as a ‘clearing house’ for
conflicts between locations, as, for example in 2004 when Belgian and
British delegates complained about the infringement of the transparency
principle by the Bochum works council (Telljohann, 2007). The coex-
istence of an active EWC and continued inter-plant competition is perhaps
best illustrated by the comments of the Belgian EWC vice-chair Kennes
after the recent ‘Delta’ affair: while expressing satisfaction that European
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cooperation allowed the Antwerp plant to remain open despite having lost
out on Astra production, he nevertheless criticized management’s selection
decision as driven by brand considerations rather than productivity, which
would have favoured the Belgian site.
In fact, in the national context trade union positions continue to reflect
inter-plant competition. In the UK, for example, support for the EWC
has since the late 1990s been combined with a lobby directed at the
national government for a ‘European level playing field’ in terms of
labour law. The campaign was based on the suspicion that multinational
firms, among them GM, often singled out UK sites to bear the brunt of
restructuring because it was cheaper and easier to dismiss people in
Britain than on the continent. The underlying logic is expressed in the
‘level playing field’ metaphor: the aim is to ensure fair rules of competi-
tion between European countries.
The reasons for the continued attachment of trade unions to ‘their’
national context are well-known and need not be rehearsed here (Pasture
and Verberckmoes, 1998). It is useful to recall though that similar con-
flicts arise within countries (Hoffmann, 2006). Indeed, they are particu-
larly difficult to avoid in situations of competition for new investment
since local strategies are often adapted to specific circumstances, which
are difficult to translate into a logic of redistribution (Kristensen and
Zeitlin, 2005).
The more important point for the analysis is that competition between
locations in itself does not prevent the development of EWCs. At GM,
worker representatives realized that to some extent they were all in the
same boat and that no national group could achieve its objectives with-
out a degree of cross-border cooperation. So far, we have looked at this
pattern from an intra-European perspective. The analysis now turns to
the external dimension of the European trade union ‘risk community’.
A European Trade Union ‘Risk Community’: External Dimension
As indicated above, this external dimension is closely connected to
changes in global corporate strategy, two elements of which should be
distinguished. First, GM embarked on a radical process of global prod-
uct standardization. New models were developed on ‘global platforms’,
designed to rationalize the various model ranges sold throughout
the world. This globalization process was far from linear; it suffered set-
backs because of market constraints, and was contested within the com-
pany, illustrated most drastically in the open fight between GM
International and Opel management in 1997. Yet the overall direction
continued, and as a result European operations became much more inte-
grated into the global company (Bordenave and Lung, 2003). Since 2004
this process has further accelerated as Detroit has increased its corporate
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control over the regional company groupings in Europe, Asia and Latin
America (Banyuls and Haipeter, 2007).
Second, GM’s global production geography changed significantly. On
the one hand, its European borders shifted east with the new plants in
East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. On the other hand, GM invested
in new growth areas outside the ‘triad’ countries, engaging in large-scale
joint ventures in Russia and China, and taking over the Korean manu-
facturer Daewoo. As a consequence, the relative position of the tradi-
tional European operations declined (Bordenave and Lung, 2003).
Against this background, the active role of the EWC has been favoured
not only by union perceptions of mutual vulnerability within Europe but
also by fears for the future of European operations within GM’s global
architecture. Moreover, the importance of European management struc-
tures for union strategies further increased, since GM’s global strategies
were the result of interactions between Detroit and the regional divisions
in North America, Europe, Latin America, and Asia.
The link between ‘European interests’ and corporate globalization was
already discernible in the first preparatory encounters leading up to the
creation of the EWC in the mid-1990s. Leading Opel works councillors
spoke of the necessity for a new ‘European thinking’ when GM was
investing large sums in other parts of the world. British representatives
warned that GM’s new plants in Asia were a threat to long-term employ-
ment prospects in Europe. After the EWC was established in 1996, simi-
lar fears continued to be expressed; the German EWC chair warned that
accelerated investments in Asia, partly financed from European profits,
would come at the expense of necessary improvements of European
products and facilities.
EWC concerns were related to both elements of GM’s corporate glob-
alization. There was a great deal of anxiety about its shifting production
geography. German employee representatives had protested in 1993
against employment cuts and wage concessions by arguing that it was
thanks to ‘German profits’ that GM had been able to invest in other
European operations in Belgium, Spain and Sweden. Now the same argu-
ment was shifted a level ‘higher’: profits made in ‘Europe’ should be re-
invested there rather than used for GM’s global expansion plans.
The new global platform strategy equally caused apprehension because
it made production in European locations to some extent substitutable
across continents. Future investments and jobs could no longer be taken
for granted by virtue of the company’s need to sell a distinctly European
model range. Moreover, the platform concept increased GM’s bench-
marking options with regard to production processes. Indeed, the first
joint EWC action was a protest against the ‘template’ project in 1997,
a study designed to quantify potential cost savings in European manufac-
turing operations against the benchmark of GM’s NUMMI plant in the
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USA (Rehder, 2003). Leading EWC representatives also argued that GM’s
European workers were already paying the price for the misconceived
strategy of global product standardization, which had prevented the
development of vehicles in tune with European market demand. Again,
this argument had previously been used by the German works council to
request more independence for national management and the Opel brand.
Now it was ‘Europeanized’: the EWC claimed that GM’s ‘European
brands’ Opel, Saab and Vauxhall needed more autonomy and a more
European product profile to achieve a turnaround in sales, and hence a
stabilization of employment prospects.
Since 2000 the importance of corporate globalization for GM’s EWC
has increased though the emphasis of its arguments has shifted slightly.
In the light of the continued dynamics of global platform development,
it no longer concentrates exclusively on the advocacy of European 
autonomy but also lobbies for a stronger role of European operations
within the globalization process. This approach has two rather uneasily
coexisting aspects. The EWC promotes European leadership for global
product development and, in terms of marketing, greater export oppor-
tunities for European brands in other world regions. The latter point, for
example, was explicitly included in the 2001 ‘Olympia’ restructuring
framework agreement. On the other hand, EWC representatives argue
that European sales of non-European GM brands (such as Chevrolet)
should be sourced from production plants in Europe. The joint EWC
bargaining position with regard to the ‘Delta’ decision in 2007 rested
ultimately on the demand that plants without the new investment would
be compensated by the allocation of non-European GM models des-
tined for sale in European markets. A EWC press release a few days prior
to the decision pointed out that ‘an important principle for the employee
representatives would be that cars which should be sold in the European
market should be produced in the European plants’. The EWC chair
summarized this approach rather bluntly as based on the assumption that
Europe should obtain a greater slice of the global cake.
Anxiety about expansion of GM operations in other parts of the world
has remained a EWC leitmotiv. Indeed, after the end of GM’s ill-fated
merger experiment with Fiat in 2005, employee representatives became
ever more concerned about this process, which was increasingly per-
ceived as a deliberate company strategy to ‘move east’. Plans to open fur-
ther plants in Russia, Poland and Romania caused as much uproar as
newspaper interviews of leading GM managers alluding to a potential
longer-term shift of GM activities to Eastern Europe, China, Korea and
India. Links were drawn between the changing GM geography and the
global platform approach: once new capacities were installed in Eastern
Europe and Asia, plants in Western Europe would be forced into cost
competition with these new facilities. Global car architectures, an EWC
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leaflet warned in March 2007, meant that ‘a single plant can manufacture
very different GM brands and models and that production can be trans-
ferred between plants even beyond Europe within six weeks’.
To counter such threats the EWC has adopted a twin-track approach.
In the negotiations with GM management it plays the ‘commercial card’
by emphasizing the distinctive features of the European car market,
which the company ignores at its peril. The mediocre market perform-
ance of GM in Europe since the mid-1990s reinforces this argument and
the derived lobby for innovative ‘European’ car design and engineering
and the cultivation of European brand images. Given that European mar-
ket demand indeed differs from America and Asia in crucial respects
(Jürgens, 2004), the EWC argues that GM’s own business success
depends on the retention of a distinctly European style, which in turn
would guarantee future employment.
At the same time, the EWC attempts to build a united front of work-
forces and their representatives across the continent to demonstrate that
plans for a globalization at the expense of European locations will meet
resistance, and hence damage the company’s business in the region. It is
not least to this end that the EWC has created the gmworkersblog, an
Internet forum providing reports and debates about ongoing European
negotiations, and a space for exchange between workers and union rep-
resentatives. ‘European solidarity’ has become the buzzword on the
forum, defined not only as an intra-European affair but, still more
importantly, as the necessity to stand united in the defence of European
interests within the global GM network.
The importance of this latter objective can again be illustrated by the
‘Delta’ negotiations. EWC leaders strongly discouraged representatives
in ‘Delta’ plants from concluding local agreements, not only by pointing
to the dangers of an intra-European race to the bottom but also by high-
lighting the risks inherent in GM’s globalization even for the winners of
the ‘Delta’ competition. 
The allocation of a future global product like the next Astra does not
make a plant and the jobs ‘safe’ anymore. After getting the new product
the workers, unions and works councils can easily be blackmailed by
management to make further concessions, otherwise the plant can lose its
production to a ‘cheaper’ plant worldwide.
After the selection decision, angry workers in Antwerp were reminded
that European solidarity had enabled the plant to stay open and that
the allocation of two other GM models, which had originally been 
scheduled for production in Eastern Europe or Asia, represented a great
success.
Clearly, not all of this rhetoric can be taken at face value since it cer-
tainly also served to downplay the fact that there had been indeed winners
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and losers, and that the agreement itself had only been possible at the
expense of further massive cost-saving programmes. Moreover, it is
striking how much EWC positions reflect a European solidarity notion
essentially designed for the defence of West European locations against
competition from Eastern Europe. One straightforward interpretation of
this pattern would be that East European delegates are still a very small
minority within the EWC. This, however, would not explain the fact that
labour representatives from Gliwice participated in the ‘Delta’ campaign,
though less actively than their West European colleagues. The crucial
point appears to be that EWC thinking reflects the ‘insider’ approach
characteristic of traditional works council politics in Germany (Hohn,
1988): interest representation is concentrated on existing workforces with
an inherent tendency to discriminate against ‘outsiders’.
In principle this need not imply an East–West cleavage, yet given that
GM is unlikely to open new plants in Western Europe the insider–out-
sider ambiguity remains confined to Eastern Europe. While continuous
efforts are made to take account of the interests of insider locations such
as Gliwice, the EWC, understandably fearful of the creation of further
overcapacity that might endanger the future of traditional locations,
adopts a hostile approach towards potential ‘new entrants’. The accept-
ance of this approach by Polish delegates, though not unproblematic
especially in cases of new investments in other Polish locations (Banyuls
and Haipeter, 2007), is facilitated by the fact that they, too, do not appear
totally ‘safe’.
From this evidence it appears clearly that the perception of a shared
(West) European vulnerability to the external threat constituted by corpo-
rate globalization has taken strong roots at GM, and it has been a crucial
element for the transformation of the company’s EWC from a consultation
committee to a negotiation body.
Conclusions
Today the EWC at GM is widely regarded as the primary example of
cross-border trade union cooperation on the continent, and it seems likely
that its future development will have consequences far beyond the com-
pany itself. This article has attempted to reconstruct the development of
the EWC, applying the concept of a European trade union risk commun-
ity, which since the mid 1990s has faced unprecedented challenges to
employee interests as a result of intra-European competition for invest-
ment, and externally, as a result of GM’s strategy of corporate globaliza-
tion. The EWC offered broad ‘safety barriers’, a still well-confined
European defence of local and national union interests where it appeared
that these could no longer be defended at the domestic level alone.
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Placed within the broader picture of EWC research, these findings
lend support to structure- rather than agency-based interpretations; yet
they point to structures that facilitate rather than obstruct the emergence
of European trade union understanding. It should be emphasized again
that this is not to deny the relevance of agency factors not considered in
this article since these are necessary to translate shared perceptions into
joint actions. What is claimed here, however, is that if we wish to account
for the difference between the development of the GM EWC and those
in EU-based automobile firms we must look to company structures and
strategies, and their perceptions by labour representatives in the different
locations.
Such conclusions may disappoint hopes for the emergence of a ‘truly’
transnational labour identity. They confirm Kotthoff’s view (2006: 174)
that even successful EWCs ‘do not have a strong European identity . . . in
the sense of strong affective bonds and collective feelings’. Cross-border
cooperation in a risk community seems fragile, issue-specific and depend-
ent on the coincidence of local and national interests. In a broader per-
spective this may be interpreted as a weak variant of Durkheim’s ‘organic
solidarity’, which Hyman (1999) has recently brought back to the agenda
of trade union studies. Contrary to ‘mechanical solidarity’ based on cate-
gories ascribed to actors (such as class), organic solidarity is the result of
a reconciliation of different interests, reflecting a situation of mutual inter-
dependence in which actors have to rely on each other to achieve their
own objectives.
Essentially, these conclusions represent a warning against a reading of
the GM case as heralding a new age of labour transnationalism destined
to overcome union parochialism. Indeed, the remarkable strengthening
of European trade union cooperation at GM seems to have gone hand in
hand with a partial transformation of that parochialism towards a new,
geographically extended form: Eurocentrism. The case study material
suggests that European cooperation was to an important extent achieved
through a contraposition of (West) European and non-European inter-
ests. Significantly, this process appears to have been accompanied by
increasing tensions between GM’s European labour representatives and
the American United Auto Workers (UAW), which has shown little
interest in international trade union cooperation (Anner et al., 2006). In
contrast to firms like Volkswagen and Renault, no ‘world works council’
has yet been created at GM.
Given the apparent danger that European works councils may turn
into ‘protectionist’ instruments, it would seem important for future
research to pay more attention to the role of EWCs in processes of cor-
porate globalization beyond regulatory issues such as codes of conduct.
This is not only likely to enhance our understanding of EWC function-
ing but can, perhaps, help to raise the awareness for the future challenge
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to reconcile parochial European interests with those of workers in other
world regions.
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